6. The climate crisis

This is the sixth in a series of thematic briefings on the environmental consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, jointly prepared by the Conflict and Environment Observatory and Zoï Environment Network. This work is supported by the United Nations Environment Programme as part of its efforts to monitor the environmental situation in Ukraine.

Situation

The armed conflict in Ukraine has seen unprecedented attention on its impact on the global climate. This has included its influence on global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, both domestically and through reverberating international pathways, and on Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to decarbonise its economy and adapt to a changing climate. In bringing long-overdue attention to the carbon cost of warfare, the conflict has highlighted the absence of methods for tracking wartime emissions, the extent of global fossil fuel insecurity, and generated expectations over how Ukraine’s post-war recovery should accelerate its climate action.

Contents

Overview and key themes

Climate policy prior to 2022

Climate policy under fire

The conflict’s influence on GHG emissions

The conflict’s impact on Ukraine’s climate mitigation and adaptation efforts

Climate action during recovery

Case study: Emissions from damaged Black Sea gas infrastructure

Background

Estimating the GHG emissions from the burning platform

Immediate and future needs

Overview and key themes

The armed conflict is occurring at a time of growing global concern over the accelerating climate crisis, but several factors have served to boost international attention on its climatic dimensions. These have included the role that fossil fuels are playing in financing the conflict, the impact that their weaponisation has had on regional and international energy security, high level political advocacy by the Ukrainian government in global climate fora, and the work of researchers determined to track the invasion’s GHG emissions. 

This is the first time that an effort has been made to comprehensively track the emissions from any conflict. As such, it has required the development of methodologies that are continuing to evolve. This reflects the historic lack of attention that conflict emissions have enjoyed in the long-standing debates over climate change and security. Elsewhere, the government of Ukraine and the World Bank have sought to place a financial value on the emissions generated for the purposes of reparations, and a damage estimate, respectively, with each arriving at very different sums.    

The geopolitical ramifications of the armed conflict have undermined the international cooperation necessary to address the climate crisis. However, fears over energy security have encouraged a policy environment favourable to the expansion of renewable energy, particularly in the EU. Yet fossil fuel consumption remains high globally. This includes from sanctioned Russian sources thanks to some of its reduced exports finding new markets. Nevertheless, increased awareness of the relationship between emissions and armed conflicts in the context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is welcome.   

Also welcome are the vocal calls for Ukraine’s recovery to be sustainable. Ukraine and the international community face an historic opportunity to use its early recovery and post-war periods to accelerate the country’s green transition, in terms of both mitigation and adaptation to climate change. However, the challenges are substantial, and success will require major legislative, regulatory and governance changes, substantial investments, as well as a starkly different security environment.

Climate policy prior to 2022

Prior to 2022, Ukraine’s economy was highly carbon intensive, with its energy, industry and agricultural sectors accounting for 74% of its emissions in 2021. A decline in Ukraine’s GDP after the collapse of the Soviet economy, and later due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, reduced its GHG emissions from 942.8 MT-CO₂ in 1990, to 327.3 in 2021. As an Annex 1 party to the UNFCCC, Ukraine has met its obligations on emissions reporting and reductions. although this target was achieved due to economic decline rather than climate mitigation measures. It also maintains systems for evaluating anthropogenic emissions and GHG absorption, and an electronic register of carbon units. 

In 2016, Ukraine ratified the Paris Agreement, establishing a 40% reduction target against 1990 levels, which allowed its emissions to grow significantly. It subsequently developed a package of climate policies and regulations during the five years prior to 2022.¹ The updated 2030 climate target under the Paris Agreement, which Ukraine submitted to the UNFCCC in 2021, aimed to slightly reduce emissions compared to 2019, while pursuing economic growth. Ukraine announced its readiness to align itself with the European Green New Deal in mid-2020, and consideration was being given as to how this might be achieved prior to February 2022.

Ukraine is highly vulnerable to the effects of the climate crisis, including through increasing aridisation in its southern regions, floods, wildfires and heatwaves, and over the longer-term, sea level rise. Its adaptation efforts began a decade ago, with national actions, as well as with piecemeal projects in its river basins. Ukraine has developed a national adaptation strategy and action plan until 2030, advancing both countrywide and sectoral adaptation planning, and has been working on its first National Adaptation Communication to the UNFCCC.

Public awareness around climate change was relatively well developed prior to 2022. A UNDP study undertaken in 2020 found that 82.5% of respondents agreed that it was a serious problem in Ukraine. This view varied little between genders, and across age and educational groups, although was most prominent among 18-24 year olds. A 2022 study found that this had grown to 91%.  

Climate policy under fire

The armed conflict has not significantly altered the Ukrainian government’s position on climate change, and it has continued to play a part in international climate processes, this has included submitting emissions inventories. As there is a two year delay in UNFCCC reporting, 2023’s submission deals with emissions in 2021, and thus conditions prior to the current armed conflict. Ukraine’s national environmental security and adaptation strategy appears to still be active.  

One substantial change has been Ukraine’s use of environmental fora and processes to highlight the impact of the armed conflict. This was perhaps most notable at the UNFCCC’s COP27 meeting, bringing overdue attention to the relationship between conflict, occupation and emissions. A further result of the conflict has been its impact on the regional dimensions of climate action, making exchanges on climate policy, disaster risk reduction and water cooperation, more difficult. 

The conflict’s influence on GHG emissions

In spite of two decades of international discussion on the relationship between security and climate change, the pathways through which conflicts can influence GHG emissions have received little attention. This means that there is no established methodology for calculating wartime emissions, nor consensus on how they should be reported. With updated calculations and the third iteration of its methodology to be published at COP28, the Initiative on GHG Accounting of War has sought to document GHG emissions during the armed conflict in Ukraine. Its 12-month interim assessment calculated emissions at 120 m tCO₂e; almost equivalent to the total GHG annual emissions of a country like Belgium.

On a domestic level, factors influencing conflict emissions include those directly generated by military activity, including land, marine and aviation fuels, extending to urban and landscape fires, and fires from damaged energy infrastructure. Changes in energy production can also influence emissions, whether through the increased use of domestic generators, or shifts in the types of fuel used. Internal displacement patterns and demographic shifts need to be considered, as do the negative effects of reduced industrial or economic activity in some sectors. In many cases, these activities, and their emissions, may be displaced internally or extraterritorially. It is anticipated that one of the largest sources of emissions for Ukraine will be the carbon cost of reconstruction.

Calculating such trends can be complex. For example, official data on Ukraine’s industrial GHG emissions is unavailable. However, declines in industrial output can be indirectly estimated through annual data on other pollutants reported to the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Compared to 2021, in 2022 emissions have halved from public electricity and heat production, petroleum refining and other energy industries, as well as from the manufacturing and construction sectors. The reported drop in the iron and steel sector averaged 80%. One can cautiously assume that the reduction of GHG emissions in these sectors may be of a comparable scale although, in the case of iron and steel, production and emissions may have been displaced abroad. 

The conflict has also had a substantial and complex impact on regional and global GHG emissions. The attacks on the Nord Stream pipeline released large quantities of methane, whose contribution to the climate crisis was greater than if it had been burned to release CO₂. Sanctions and energy security fears have had a major impact on Russian oil and gas production. Although some Russian exports have found alternative routes, by October 2023 Russian fossil fuel exports had reached their lowest level since February 2022. The same factors have encouraged increased attention on the renewable energy transition in the EU and elsewhere, a trend that may, if sustained, accelerate emissions reductions from some sources. Price spikes linked to the conflict affected many sectors, including agriculture and the production of fertilisers. Reduced fertiliser use reduces GHG emissions but the picture is complicated by associated changes in land use and crop types.   

The closure of Russian and Ukrainian airspace has had a major impact on civilian aviation, leading to the rerouting of flights and increased fuel consumption. One knock-on effect has been the expansion of airports and routes in states in Central Asia to compensate. Military expenditure and readiness training have grown in response to geopolitical tensions and to service the conflict, both factors will have generated emissions. Geopolitics has also impacted the international cooperation needed to tackle the climate crisis, while in Russia, grassroots climate activism has felt the chill of martial law.

The conflict’s impact on Ukraine’s climate mitigation and adaptation efforts

In addition to diverting human and financial resources away from climate mitigation and adaptation, damage linked to the conflict has also undermined Ukraine’s ability to reduce its emissions – although this must be viewed in the context of reduced economic output overall. Numerous renewable energy facilities have been damaged by the fighting or remain subject to occupation. This includes solar and wind farms, many of which are concentrated in the south east of the country. 

The energy crisis Ukraine faced after Russia targeted its generating and transmission infrastructure has helped underscore the resilience that distributed renewable energy generation can provide. Throughout 2022-2023, Ukrainian cities have worked on climate and energy plans, developing new projects and searching for financing. NGO and international partners have supported municipalities with implementing pilot renewable energy projects for critical infrastructure, with demand growing nationally.

The loss of the Kakhovka Dam has meant the loss of hydropower capacity, although its main purpose was grid balancing rather than generation. The government declared its readiness to rebuild the dam, a decision whose environmental consequences has worried Ukrainian NGOs. More widely, should the conflict result in the long-term loss of nuclear and renewable energy generating capacity, and should electricity demand remain stable or increase, it may end up being replaced by electricity from fossil fuels, whether locally or via connections with the EU.    

The massive disruption to natural landscapes and to agricultural areas is likely to have a significant impact on Ukraine’s domestic carbon cycle. Degraded natural landscapes and the loss of vegetation reduce carbon storage potential. REECFM’s study (see box above), found that the loss of carbon storage capacity from forest fires attributable to the war is around 100,000 tonnes CO₂e per year. The REECFM suggests that Ukraine’s forests capture and store 50 million tonnes of CO₂e annually. This is equivalent to 15% of Ukraine’s GHG emissions in 2020. The impact on carbon storage in other natural and semi-natural ecosystems, in particular the cultivated fields that have suffered the most from war-time landscape fires, remains to be assessed. 

The interplay between forest and nature management, agricultural production, land abandonment, and carbon storage is more complex, and warrants research into the impacts and consequences of the war in the future.  

Climate action during recovery

Ukraine has committed to carbon neutrality by 2060 but it is expected that the cost of the war, and the challenges of recovery, will heavily impact its mitigation plans. This reinforces the importance of integrating its transition fully into recovery policies. Ukrainian civil society has been calling for Ukraine’s recovery to be green and sustainable since at least May 2022. For Ukraine to meet its own domestic targets, both mitigation and adaptation will need to be foregrounded in post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. The process of recovery has been suggested as a unique opportunity to deliver this, whether in terms of Ukraine’s green energy transition, low-carbon construction techniques, industrial decarbonisation, or through environmental recovery and nature based solutions.   

Civil society-driven projects are already demonstrating how these goals might be achieved but will need to be scaled-up nationally. This will require regulatory action at the government level, and implementation at the regional (oblast) level, for example on building regulations, on decentralised energy markets and on emissions reporting and targets. Throughout, Ukraine will look to align itself with the EU’s Green New Deal.  

The human capacity to deliver the energy transition will need to be addressed, with capacity building and training in low carbon construction and energy installation. Ukraine’s historic fossil fuel dependency also creates major challenges, including designing and managing a just transition for former coal mining communities in its Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which are currently dissected by the frontline. While the Ukrainian government has reaffirmed its commitment to phasing out state-owned coal power plants by 2035, no action plan has yet been developed. 

Adaptation projects are ongoing in spite of the conflict. For example, the EU-backed Apena3 project has been assessing the climate vulnerability of different economic sectors across three pilot regions: Lviv, Mykolaiv and Ivano-Frankivsk, as part of Ukraine’s Oblast Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. Mykolaiv Oblast continues to be highly exposed to the conflict. Elsewhere the UNDP and partners recently trained municipal representatives from more than 100 towns and cities in the analysis of climate risks and in adaptation planning. 

Coming as it has at a time of unprecedented international concern over the accelerating climate crisis, the climate-sensitivity of Ukraine’s recovery is likely to be viewed as a test for the international community, as well as of its government and its people. Early signs have been mixed. Fossil fuels play a major and expanded role in short and mid-term economic recovery plans. Whereas the government aims to fully decarbonise the energy sector by 2050 through the development of renewable and nuclear energy technologies. Small nuclear reactors have been specifically promoted by energy providers and some international partners, meanwhile civil society remains concerned over the repeated relegation of climate and environmental considerations in international recovery conferences. 

Case study: Emissions from damaged Black Sea gas infrastructure

Background

On 20th June 2022, early morning attacks on Black Sea gas platforms were reported as having resulted in significant damage.² The Black Sea is strategically important, and the strikes were a part of Ukraine’s ultimately successful counteroffensive effort to reduce naval attacks on settlements, and create a safe passage for grain shipments. The Black Sea gas fields and platforms had been captured by Russia following its 2014 annexation of Crimea. 

The key infrastructure comprises the ‘Boiko’ towers,³ which Russia subsequently moved closer to annexed Crimea, two fixed drilling platforms – Tavrida and Sivash – and three ‘block conductor’ platforms. Russia maintained military personnel on the platforms and used them for surveillance of surface, underwater and air,⁴ in particular using the Neva-BS radar, providing near complete control over shipping in the Black Sea. It has also been claimed that the Russian navy was hiding ships behind the platforms to evade Ukrainian missiles.

Initial reports of the 20th June attacks were characterised by confusion and contradiction over which platforms were which, and if or how they had been damaged. Satellite data pointed to the ‘block conductor 1’ (BK-1) platform being the most environmentally significant location. A fire and plume visible within hours has – astonishingly – continued to burn to the time of publication, generating substantial GHG emissions (see below). A 7 km² oil spill was also visible in the vicinity of BK-1 on 21st June.⁵ Although the source of the oil is unclear, it may have been associated with rescue vessels in the area – two of which were visible on imagery from 22nd June dousing BK-1.⁶ It is important to note that BK-1 and Tavrida sit in Zernov’s Phyllophora Field, an ecologically important area in the Black Sea that has been threatened by a number of incidents linked to the conflict.⁷

Media reporting on the precise sequence of events was limited, however a basic timeline can be constructed from Russian media:

• Jun 21, morning – “the fire approached the well”;
• Jun 21, afternoon – “the fire on the first tower does not subside”;
• June 22 – “Weather conditions worsened in the area of the search and rescue operation”;
• Jun 24 – “Two pipes stopped burning as the gas ran out. Four more are still burning since the 20th. Two of the company’s vessels temporarily stopped extinguishing the fire – due to the strong sea conditions”. 

No further substantive information was released on the fire, nor the fate of the people missing at sea. Russia’s Ministry of Defence’s account was that anti-ship missiles and UAV’s hit BK-1 and the Ukrainian jack-up rig,⁸ “threatening an environmental disaster”.⁹ No images from the facilities were shared, but the glow could be seen from Odesa. Although footage of a missile exploding on the Tavrida platform was uploaded by Ukrainian forces, this was likely a separate incident on 25th June 2022.¹⁰ By the 4th July Russian media were reporting that everything was operating as normal, ignoring the ongoing fire on BK-1.

There were no publicly reported incidents at the gas field’s infrastructure for more than a year. On 22nd August 2023 the Ukrainian military recaptured the platforms. The operation included an exchange of fire in very close proximity to a platform. Three weeks later, Ukrainian forces released footage of the mission, showing a platform being boarded and the removal of surveillance equipment and ammunition. This was likely Tavrida as the burning BK-1 platform is visible nearby. There were also photographs released from onboard the Ukraine and Petro Hodovanets drilling rigs.

Estimating the GHG emissions from the burning platform

The continued fire at BK-1 from 20th June 2022 until this briefing’s publication date in November 2023 is akin to emergency flaring. However we have no indication where on the platform the point of combustion is, how intentional or safe the burning is, and what may happen in the future. To try and determine its climatic impact, we have estimated the GHG emissions from the flaring using satellite data and known emission factors. 

The volume of flaring gas can be estimated from data collected at night by the VIIRS instrument. This data is processed into ‘Nightfire’ data, which provides the temperature and radiant heat of a flare, and from which flaring volume can be derived by applying a calibration. We estimate that between 20th June 2022 and 17th November 2023, 0.1892 billion cubic metres of flared gas have been emitted.¹¹ This represents a substantial contribution to the global flaring total. Considering the emissions over a one year period, the fire would rank 173rd of all 8,434 upstream gas flares detected globally in 2022.¹² If the flaring platform were a country, it would rank 49th out of 87 states that flare gas, higher than the combined totals of countries like Norway and Bahrain. 

A rough conversion indicates a central estimate of at least 0.34 million metric tonnes of CO₂ equivalent.¹³ This would likely make it the most significant single contributor to CO₂ emissions in Ukrainian territory during the war. This conversion is very conservative as it unrealistically assumes 100% burning efficiency. Typically, efficiencies of 98% are assumed, but recent airborne measurements suggest it is more like 91%, generating up to five times more methane emissions. Particulate matter is also emitted from flaring and we estimate that around 303 tonnes of black carbon have been produced.¹⁴ Black carbon is the most important component with respect to climate change as it is a short-lived climate forcer in the atmosphere, and can be advected to polar regions where it accelerates melting. 

Because of the numerous uncertainties, our emissions estimates should be treated as provisional and require further, deeper analysis. The estimates also need to be dynamic as gas will continue to burn at BK-1 until the security situation allows an engineering solution – though the complexity of that is unknown.¹⁵ Until that point, its GHG emissions will continue, to no one’s benefit.

Given the emergency flaring and the nature of the damage at BK-1, a further question arises – has there also been leaking of gas? Leaks could have occurred at any of the infrastructure, and one report mentioned how platform workers “let off the gas”. Direct release of methane could be even more significant than the flaring emissions, given its higher global warming potential. Unfortunately we can only get limited insight remotely,¹⁶ and the data used in recent seminal studies is not available to us in this case.¹⁷ While a crude approach using openly available Landsat-8 data suggests that there has not been a huge methane leak,¹⁸ this method is unlikely to capture emissions at low source rates. The possibility therefore remains that there may still be a climatically significant methane leak and we recommend further investigation with the WorldView-3, GHGSat, and EnMAP satellites.

Without the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Russia’s capture of the ‘Boiko’ towers, Ukrainian gas fields may have been producing three to five times more fossil gas.¹⁹ Therefore although the ongoing fire at BK-1 continues to be a significant source of GHG emissions, the wider arc of the conflict has reduced Black Sea emissions; although these will have been displaced by production elsewhere. It is highly likely that the end of the conflict will see a quick resumption of production,²⁰ and exploration,²¹ even against a backdrop where the UNFCCC is recommending no further exploration of fossil fuels by 2030. 

Case study acknowledgements

With thanks to the Earth Observation Group, Payne Institute for Public Policy for providing processed VIIRS Nightfire flaring data.²²

Immediate and future needs

Ukraine’s recovery is increasingly being viewed as a test for whether and how the international community can support states to emerge from conflict in a way that accelerates their green energy transition, promotes adaptation and aligns climate and nature goals. Making these aims a reality will require support and engagement from stakeholders including the government, international community, civil society, scientific community and the private sector.

i) Climate mainstreaming

Embed cross-sectoral climate adaptation and mitigation in all recovery and reconstruction policies and programming, and support its implementation; this should include supporting and scaling up the emerging climate-friendly reconstruction projects that can provide examples for future larger scale recovery.

ii) Build capacity for the green transition

Provide capacity building and training to boost Ukraine’s human resources for its energy transition and green recovery.

iii) Study conflict emissions and address accounting

Support ongoing research into the conflict dynamics influencing emissions in Ukraine and globally, and address accounting gaps in the international climate system. 

iv) Ensure a green and participatory recovery

Support and ensure transparency and broad stakeholder participation in climate and energy planning.

Media enquiries: doug(at)ceobs.org or nickolai.denisov(at)zoinet.org

Research and content by CEOBS and Zoï Environment Network.

Thank you to our additional contributors and reviewers: Anna Ackermann (Centre for Environmental Initiatives “Ecoaction”, International Institute for Sustainable Development), Antonina Platonova, Hanna Plotnykova, Lennard de Klerk (Initiative on GHG accounting of war), Oleksandr Soshenskyi (National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine), Vasylyna Belo (Centre for Environmental Initiatives “Ecoaction”).

Cartography: Matthias Beilstein, Zoï Environment Network, Schaffhausen. Graphics: Matthias Belistein and  Eoghan Darbyshire, CEOBS.