Exploring environmental governance in eastern Ukraine

Introduction

Armed conflicts often lead to the deterioration of environmental governance, at both the national and local levels.¹ The consequences of this for public health and environmental protection can be serious, persistent and affect areas larger than those directly impacted by conflict.² Armed conflicts exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities and can trigger cascading effects and secondary hazards, and affected states are often highly reliant on the support of the international community to rebuild governance capacity.

During conflicts, and in their aftermath, contested areas may be administered by non-state actors. These administrations, and the new territories they hold, may not be recognised by the international community, and their degree of formality and organisation varies widely. Little is known about the effectiveness of non-state actors in the provision of environmental governance, or how the local population perceives them.³ This is in spite of their proliferation in contemporary armed conflicts. And, while engaging with armed non-state actors is considered an important tool for the protection of civilians, it is underdeveloped when it comes to environmental protection.

The situation mirrors the significant gaps in the international legal framework for the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, and in the context of non-international armed conflicts in particular. However, the situation is gradually changing, with one newly launched research project aiming to increase understanding of their environmental behaviours. This blog seeks to contribute to this knowledge gap by exploring the state of environmental governance in the breakaway regions of eastern Ukraine.

Environmental threats in eastern Ukraine

The Donbas region of eastern Ukraine is a heavily industrialised area with a high concentration of technological hazards. Before the military confrontation, its Donetsk and Luhansk regions were home to about 4,500 potentially environmentally hazardous businesses. Of these, 2,160 sites were considered potentially explosive, 24 contained radiation hazards, 909 were listed as hydro-dynamically hazardous and 34 contained biohazards.

While environmental issues in the Donbas predate the armed conflict, the conflict has significantly increased environmental risks. Both the Ukrainian government, and the de-facto authorities in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People Republics, have regularly raised concerns over the potential for an environmental catastrophe.

More than 80% of the enterprises and critical public infrastructure affected during combat operations belongs to the “dangerous” or “very dangerous” environmental-risk categories, and several of the 39 flooded coal mines contain hazardous materials. Concerns have also been raised about the potential flooding of the Yunkom mine, which was used for an underground nuclear test.

The Donbas’ land, terrain, surface and subterranean waters, vegetation and wildlife have sustained damage because of military activities, and clearing unexploded ordnance may take decades. The Siverskyi (Seversky) Donets River, the most polluted river in Ukraine before the outbreak of hostilities, has been further contaminated during the conflict. The conflict has significantly impacted ecosystems, and 150,000 ha of forests, which play a critical role in preventing soil erosion protection, and more than 78 conservation sites have sustained damage.

Since the onset of the conflict, the Ukrainian government no longer receives information from the air and water quality monitoring posts that used to be located in what are now non-government controlled territories. Such posts represented more than half of the water and air quality monitoring network in the region. While several actors have published data on the environmental impact of the conflict, no comprehensive field assessment of its impact has been undertaken.

How has environmental governance fared in eastern Ukraine?

The “Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR)” self-declared after the Ukrainian government lost control of part of the Donbas. The public governance institutions set up by the de-facto authorities have staff, and an active internet presence. I recently used this, and other sources to examine the role that the de-facto authorities are playing in environmental governance in the areas under their control.

The analysis suggests that institutional adaptation is taking place in eastern Ukraine. The de-facto authorities in both areas have developed institutional, legal and policy frameworks for environmental protection, and for natural resource management, with each ‘republic’ establishing a distinctive institutional set-up.

In the LNR, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecological Safety (MNRES) is the key specialised executive body in the field of environment protection. According to its formal mandate, MNRES implements state policy and makes proposals to improve legislation in the field of environmental protection and safety.

The DNR has its State Committee for Environmental Policy and Natural Resources (SCEPNR), which fulfils a similar role. The SCEPNR is accountable to the “head of government” and is mandated to develop and implement environmental policies, control the compliance of enterprises with environmental legislation, and inform the population about the state of the environment. Other key institutions in the DNR include the Committee of Land Resources, the State Committee on Forest and Hunting, and the State Committee for Water and Fisheries.

Environmental laws are frequently waived or ignored during conflicts. However, the activities of both the LNR and DNR suggest that intensive normative work across multiple environmental sectors has been undertaken. This includes activities on forest management; waste management and chemicals; protected areas; biodiversity conservation; the management of disaster risks connected to natural and man-made hazards; and monitoring, compliance and enforcement mechanisms. The de-facto authorities claim that ecological inspections of enterprises and the enforcement of regulations have been resumed, to some extent, in both breakaway regions.

According to the statements of the de-facto authorities in the DNR, an overarching environmental policy framework for the area is under development. Meanwhile, a Policy for Forest Recovery and Regreening for 2018-23 already exists, and can be consulted online. In the LNR, the recently approved ‘National Environmental Plan (NEP)’ outlines a mid-term policy framework and plan of action for 2019-23 across 13 sectors. Analysis of the NEP reveals a number of very interesting findings. For instance, the LNR’s de-facto authorities plan to develop compensation claims addressed to Ukraine for environmental damage; and legislation is expected to be enhanced in accordance with the general tendency to unify the LNR’s legal framework with Russia’s. A politically motivated process, this mirrors Ukraine, which consistently aligns its legal framework with that of the EU.

Disengagement from transboundary environmental cooperation, as well as bilateral and multilateral environmental agreements can occur during conflicts, and can contribute to the collapse of environmental governance.⁴ Yet the breakaway republics in eastern Ukraine are forging alliances and signing bilateral agreements with each other for environmental cooperation on protected areas, waste management, forest management, and transboundary water management.

In 2017, a joint initiative was launched by the DNR and LNR – the Humanitarian Programme for Reuniting the People of Donbas and Environmental Safety. One of its focus areas is ensuring environmental safety in the Donbas. The initiative envisioned the creation of a joint inspection team to monitor the safety of industrial enterprises. In doing so, the de-facto authorities also requested unhindered access to energy, water and gas facilities located in the government-controlled part of the Donbas. Access was to be granted to environmental and humanitarian organisations of the “republics”, as well as to international organisations recommended by the de-facto authorities, on the pretext that these facilities can create risks for the citizens of the “republics”.

The NEP also proposes that the LNR studies the feasibility of adopting international environmental conventions, aiming to improve its international image by enforcing international environmental law. However, while the LNR could introduce these legal norms, unrecognised self-proclaimed states (or republics) cannot become parties to international conventions. This suggests that it may be motivated by propagandistic intentions.

Environmental monitoring, data collection and information sharing are commonly hindered during armed conflicts. However, documents available online suggest that environmental monitoring in both breakaway republics has been resumed to a certain degree, and as early as 2015 in the LNR, with ongoing efforts to enhance it. According to the statements of the DNR’s de-facto authorities, measurements of water, soils and emissions of stationary and mobile sources of atmospheric air pollution are being conducted.

It is also claimed that multiple interactive maps of air pollution, surface water, and the coal industry have been developed. However, neither monitoring data nor most of these maps can be consulted online. Therefore, there is no evidence that they actually exist. A few exceptions include this interactive map of the DNR’s protected areas.

In parallel, while the data initiatives are welcome, it is unclear to what extent information sharing is taking place between environmental professionals across the front line. According to Freedom House, the government of Ukraine blocks the websites of the de-facto authorities, and the de-facto authorities block Ukrainian websites in the areas under their control.

Politicisation of the environment in the Donbas

Analysis of the documents and statements available online suggests that environmental protection is high on the policy agenda for both the LNR and DNR. The “environment” – unlike natural resources – is usually considered a comparatively unpolitical object of common concern, and is thus a potential entry point for discourse in contested settings. However, in the case of the Donbas, intense politicisation of the environment is evident.

For instance, statements from the de-facto authorities have accused the Ukrainian government of “ecocide”. They state that the government of Ukraine is falsifying and concealing environmental information, minimising the role that pollution from waste is having on the health of the population. And the de-facto authorities say that environmental mismanagement and a failure of governance in Ukraine is having a spill-over effect on the state of the environment in the Donbas.

It is fair to assume that this politicisation has contributed to increasing distrust between the local population and the government of Ukraine, undermining the latter’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and supporting the legitimacy claims of the de-facto authorities. However, it is also highlighting the importance of the environment as an indispensable element of the conflict resolution agenda in eastern Ukraine. But with this degree of politicisation it will likely require challenging de-sensitisation efforts. If or when a political resolution is achieved between the conflict parties, science and fact-led environmental management could help facilitate peacebuilding efforts.

Conclusion

The institutional adaptation in the field of environmental governance in the areas of the Donbas not controlled by the government of Ukraine can be considered from several perspectives. Firstly, it is important for the DNR and LNR to demonstrate that the “republics” are “normal” and legitimate states, with all the necessary bureaucracy and procedures that entails. Hence, they are encouraged to imitate normal state activity, whether or not it has any tangible effect. Secondly, the Donbas not only has a long history of pollution, but also of environmental governance. It is reasonable to assume that it has a fair number of environmental professionals who believe in environmental protection, whatever the politics may be, and for many of them their work is also their source of livelihood.

The intense politicisation of the environment in the Donbas could be a sign of a trend in contemporary warfare, where environmental information is increasingly becoming weaponised. But it is also important to consider the specific context. Relevant factors include the high concentration of technological hazards, the grievances of the local population associated with a long history of environmental decline, and the intensity of the information war. To a certain extent it could also be a response to the Ukrainian government’s support for enhancing international protection of the environment in armed conflict. For instance, the resolution it sponsored at the UN Environment Assembly in 2016. The environmental situation remains politically very sensitive internationally as well. Issues such as the risk of flooding at the Yunkom mine have also been picked up on by the US and western diplomats in statements and used to criticise Russia.

What happens to environmental governance in contested settings is critically important for health and environmental protection but it remains understudied. Understanding the role of non-state actors, be they armed groups, or new quasi-governmental administrations, is growing ever more important in contemporary armed conflicts. The case of the Donbas also illustrates that how environmental issues are framed by conflict parties and their state backers during conflicts can strongly influence the extent to which the environment can be used for conflict transformation and peacebuilding.

 

Olga Shashkina is a professional in the field of disaster risk reduction and environmental protection. Twitter: @Olga_Shashkina The author expresses gratitude to Dr Nickolai Denisov and Doug Weir for the useful dialogue and valuable feedback.